Merge chore/code-hygiene: Phase 2 #8 Auth security fixes (contained batch)

Last-admin lockout guard; access_token encryption at rest (SB1, E2E-verified);
password-login timing/enumeration; Google-adoption email_verified check; demo +
switch-account isolation. Architectural SA3 (proxy trust) + SA4 (session
revocation) deferred to the user. Verified: ruff, re-review clean, localdev boots,
YouTube sync works with encrypted token.

backend/app/auth.py

@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ from app.utils import valid_email
 PASSWORD_MIN_LEN = 10
 VERIFY_TTL = timedelta(hours=24)
 RESET_TTL = timedelta(hours=1)
+# A throwaway argon2 hash to verify against when the email is unknown / has no password, so a
+# login attempt pays the same KDF cost either way and its timing can't reveal whether the account
+# exists (anti-enumeration). Computed once at startup; it never matches a real password.
+_DECOY_PASSWORD_HASH = hash_password(secrets.token_urlsafe(16))
 _register_limiter = RateLimiter(max_events=5, window_seconds=300)
 _login_limiter = RateLimiter(max_events=10, window_seconds=300)
 _reset_limiter = RateLimiter(max_events=5, window_seconds=300)
@@ -276,6 +280,12 @@ async def callback(
                 # hijack it. (Near-impossible with real Google accounts: email↔sub is stable.)
                 log.warning("Google login email collision (different sub): %s", email)
                 return RedirectResponse(url="/?access=denied")
+            if not userinfo.get("email_verified", False):
+                # Adopting (and activating) a pre-existing password account requires Google to
+                # actually attest the address — otherwise an unverified Google email that merely
+                # collides with a pending registration could seize that account. Defense-in-depth.
+                log.warning("Google login: unverified email, refusing to adopt account: %s", email)
+                return RedirectResponse(url="/?access=denied")
             user = existing
             user.google_sub = sub
             # Google verified the email and is_allowed granted access, so finish activating a
@@ -291,6 +301,12 @@ async def callback(
         log.info("Suspended account blocked at Google login: %s", email)
         _notify_suspended(background, user.email)
         return RedirectResponse(url="/?login=suspended")
+    # Keep the email in sync with Google, but never overwrite it with one another account already
+    # owns — that would hit the unique constraint and 500, wedging this user's sign-in (rare: a
+    # Google-side email change to a value that collides with a different local account).
+    if user.email != email:
+        clash = db.query(User).filter(User.email == email, User.id != user.id).one_or_none()
+        if clash is None:
             user.email = email
     user.display_name = userinfo.get("name")
     user.avatar_url = userinfo.get("picture")
@@ -337,7 +353,9 @@ def _store_token(db: Session, user: User, token: dict) -> None:
     tok = user.token or OAuthToken(user=user)
     if token.get("refresh_token"):
         tok.refresh_token_enc = encrypt(token["refresh_token"])
-    tok.access_token = token.get("access_token")
+    # Encrypt the access token at rest too (it's a live ~1h bearer credential), matching the
+    # refresh token — a DB/backup/log leak otherwise hands out working Google API tokens.
+    tok.access_token = encrypt(token.get("access_token"))
     expires_at = token.get("expires_at")
     tok.expiry = datetime.fromtimestamp(expires_at, tz=timezone.utc) if expires_at else None
     tok.scopes = token.get("scope") or BASE_SCOPES
@@ -471,6 +489,9 @@ def demo_login(payload: dict, request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)) -
     email = (payload.get("email") or "").strip().lower()
     if valid_email(email) and is_demo_allowed(db, email):
         demo = get_or_create_demo_user(db)
+        # Isolate the demo: drop any real-account wallet on this tab first, so the demo session
+        # can't switch to / act as a previously signed-in account via the multi-account header.
+        request.session.clear()
         request.session["user_id"] = demo.id
         log.info("Demo login (key=%s, demo_id=%s)", email, demo.id)
         return {"authenticated": True}
@@ -603,7 +624,11 @@ def password_login(
     email = (payload.get("email") or "").strip().lower()
     password = payload.get("password") or ""
     user = db.execute(select(User).where(User.email == email)).scalar_one_or_none()
-    if user is None or user.is_demo or not verify_password(password, user.password_hash):
+    # Always run the KDF (against a decoy hash for an unknown / passwordless / demo account) so the
+    # response time is the same whether or not the email exists — no timing-based enumeration.
+    candidate_hash = user.password_hash if (user and not user.is_demo) else None
+    password_ok = verify_password(password, candidate_hash or _DECOY_PASSWORD_HASH)
+    if user is None or user.is_demo or not password_ok:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid email or password.")
     if user.is_suspended:
         _notify_suspended(background, user.email)

backend/app/routes/admin.py

@@ -166,7 +166,12 @@ def set_user_role(
         raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="The demo account's role can't be changed.")
     if target.id == admin.id:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="You can't change your own role.")
-    if target.role == "admin" and role == "user" and count_admins(db) <= 1:
+    if (
+        target.role == "admin"
+        and role == "user"
+        and not target.is_suspended
+        and count_admins(db, active_only=True) <= 1
+    ):
         raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Can't remove the last admin.")
     changed = target.role != role
     target.role = role
@@ -233,7 +238,7 @@ def admin_delete_user(
         raise HTTPException(
             status_code=400, detail="Delete your own account from Settings → Account."
         )
-    if target.role == "admin" and count_admins(db) <= 1:
+    if target.role == "admin" and not target.is_suspended and count_admins(db, active_only=True) <= 1:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Can't delete the last admin.")
     purge_user(db, target, background)
     return {"deleted": user_id}

backend/app/routes/me.py

@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ def switch_account(
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="That account no longer exists.")
     if not is_allowed(db, u.email):
         raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="That account no longer has access.")
+    if u.is_suspended:
+        # Don't make a suspended account the active one — the next request's current_user would
+        # see the suspension and clear the WHOLE wallet session, logging out every account here.
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="That account is suspended.")
     request.session["user_id"] = target
     return {"ok": True, "user_id": target}
 

backend/app/security.py

@@ -49,3 +49,15 @@ def decrypt(value: str | None) -> str | None:
     if value is None:
         return None
     return _require_fernet().decrypt(value.encode()).decode()
+
+
+def decrypt_optional(value: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """Like decrypt() but returns None instead of raising when the value is absent or not a valid
+    ciphertext (e.g. a legacy plaintext token stored before encryption) — so callers fall back to
+    a refresh rather than erroring."""
+    if not value:
+        return None
+    try:
+        return _require_fernet().decrypt(value.encode()).decode()
+    except Exception:
+        return None

backend/app/youtube/client.py

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import httpx
 
 from app import quota, sysconfig
 from app.models import User
-from app.security import decrypt
+from app.security import decrypt, decrypt_optional, encrypt
 
 log = logging.getLogger("siftlode.youtube")
 
@@ -76,8 +76,9 @@ class YouTubeClient:
         if tok is None:
             raise YouTubeError("User has no stored OAuth token")
         now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-        if tok.access_token and tok.expiry and tok.expiry > now + timedelta(seconds=60):
+        cached = decrypt_optional(tok.access_token)
-            return tok.access_token
+        if cached and tok.expiry and tok.expiry > now + timedelta(seconds=60):
+            return cached
         refresh = decrypt(tok.refresh_token_enc)
         if not refresh:
             raise YouTubeError("No refresh token; user must re-authenticate")
@@ -94,12 +95,13 @@ class YouTubeClient:
         if resp.status_code != 200:
             raise YouTubeError(f"Token refresh failed: {resp.status_code} {resp.text[:200]}")
         data = resp.json()
-        tok.access_token = data["access_token"]
+        access = data["access_token"]
+        tok.access_token = encrypt(access)
         tok.expiry = now + timedelta(seconds=int(data.get("expires_in", 3600)))
         self.db.add(tok)
         self.db.commit()
         log.info("Refreshed access token for user %s", self.user.id)
-        return tok.access_token
+        return access
 
     # --- core request ---
     def _get(self, path: str, params: dict, cost: int = 1, allow_key: bool = True) -> dict: