95d1549570
Signed client-side session cookies had no server-side kill switch: logout + password reset couldn't evict a stolen/copied cookie (valid until expiry). Add User.session_epoch (migration 0053), record it in the cookie at every login, and reject in current_user any cookie whose recorded epoch is behind the account's current one. - Bump the epoch on: password reset (kills ALL sessions — a reset is a compromise response), password change + a new 'Log out other sessions' action (both re-stamp the CURRENT cookie so the caller stays signed in, evicting only the others). - Per-account epoch map in the session so one account's revocation doesn't evict the other signed-in accounts in the same browser wallet. - Missing epoch (pre-SA4 cookie) is treated as 0, so the first bump revokes grandfathered sessions too. - New POST /auth/logout-others + a Settings → Account 'Active sessions' button (trilingual).
27 lines
971 B
Python
27 lines
971 B
Python
"""User.session_epoch for server-side session revocation (SA4)
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A monotonic per-user counter. A signed session cookie records the epoch it was minted under;
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current_user rejects any cookie whose epoch is stale. Bumped on password reset, password change,
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or "log out everywhere" — so a stolen/copied client-side cookie dies on those events instead of
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staying valid until it expires. Existing rows default to 0 (matching a fresh cookie's absent/0 epoch).
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"""
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from typing import Sequence, Union
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import sqlalchemy as sa
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from alembic import op
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revision: str = "0053_user_session_epoch"
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down_revision: Union[str, None] = "0052_plex_show_meta"
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branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
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depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
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def upgrade() -> None:
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op.add_column(
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"users",
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sa.Column("session_epoch", sa.Integer(), nullable=False, server_default="0"),
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)
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def downgrade() -> None:
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op.drop_column("users", "session_epoch")
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