npeter83 0850f6a13b fix(auth): decrypt the access-token fallback before revoking on account deletion ... purge_user's revoke used `decrypt(refresh) or tok.access_token`, but access_token is stored ENCRYPTED — so a token row without a refresh token would send ciphertext to Google's revoke endpoint and silently fail. Decrypt it. (Pre-existing; surfaced by the review of the OAuth-scope fix.)		2026-07-12 04:52:31 +02:00
..
alembic	feat(auth): SA4 — server-side session revocation via per-user session epoch	2026-07-12 03:00:16 +02:00
app	fix(auth): decrypt the access-token fallback before revoking on account deletion	2026-07-12 04:52:31 +02:00
alembic.ini	feat: M1 foundation — compose stack, FastAPI, Google OAuth, encrypted tokens	2026-06-11 01:01:37 +02:00
Dockerfile	feat: M1 foundation — compose stack, FastAPI, Google OAuth, encrypted tokens	2026-06-11 01:01:37 +02:00
entrypoint.sh	harden(auth): SA3 review follow-ups — IPv6-mapped match + no-proxy-headers guardrail	2026-07-12 03:49:08 +02:00
log_config.json	chore: rename remaining subfeed references to siftlode	2026-06-21 06:53:12 +02:00
requirements.txt	feat(downloads): Deno JS runtime + web/android clients to complete the POT setup	2026-07-03 22:46:32 +02:00
ruff.toml	chore(hygiene): Phase 4 guardrails — noUnusedLocals/Parameters + dead-code sweep	2026-07-12 02:15:52 +02:00